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Abstract 
 
The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate 
their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland. This paper uses laboratory 
experiments to explore the performance of the AB in achieving the socially optimal land management 
configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies. The 
AB poses a coordination problem between two Nash equilibria: a Pareto dominant and a risk 
dominant equilibrium. The experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct 
and indirect neighbors’ actions, they are more likely to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium 
relative to the case where subjects have information about their direct neighbors’ action only. 
However, the extra information can only delay – and not prevent – the transition to the socially 
inferior risk dominant Nash equilibrium. In the long run, the AB mechanism may only be partially 
effective in enhancing delivery of ecosystem services on farming landscapes featuring local networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Improvements to the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland such as carbon 
sequestration, pest management, and biodiversity and habitat protection, can be obtained by 
adopting pro-conservation land uses on these properties otherwise devoted to profit-based 
agriculture (Swinton et al. 2007). Adopting such pro-conservation land uses is typically 
costly to the farmer, meaning that they may require financial compensation for implementing 
them (Armsworth et al. 2012). As a result, Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes 
have been introduced by conservation agencies in many countries to incentivize these 
changes in land management. For example, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the 
U.S. has disbursed nearly $26 billion to retire 36.8 million acres of farmland from agriculture 
to reduce soil erosion and preserve approximately 1.8 million acres of wetland habitats 
(Kirwan et al. 2005). In Europe an increasing fraction of total spending on agriculture goes to 
funding agri-environmental schemes (Cooper et al. 2009) with further increases planned 
under reforms to the post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy. 
In the context of increasing the environmental benefits from farmland management, 
an important issue is that spatial coordination of land management efforts can generate 
ecological benefits more effectively (Hanley et al. 2012). Encouraging farmers to enrol 
adjacent land parcels which are of high ecological value by attaching greater sign-up 
payments to them has been shown to generate higher environmental benefits than scenarios 
where the incentives are not spatially differentiated (Wätzold et al. 2010). Land management 
of geographically proximate (or even adjacent) parcels/properties for creating contiguous 
habitat of at least a critical minimum size, and establishing connections between patches to 
create habitat corridor linkages facilitating species mobility is beneficial for biodiversity 
conservation  (Margules and Pressey 2000; Dallimer et al. 2010). Further, spatial clustering 
of organic farm operations can have lower negative impacts on local biodiversity and water 
quality, can mitigate losses from retiring land to create buffers preventing pesticide spill-over 
from neighbouring conventional farms, and can even reduce certification costs of organic 
farmers (Parker and Munroe 2007). Finally, landscape-level creation of non-crop habitat for 
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natural predators on the landscape is more successful in eradicating pests than strategies 
which ignore such habitat management (Landis et al. 2000; Zhang et al. 2010). 
One approach to achieving this spatial coordination of land uses and land 
management is the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) subsidy scheme (Parkhurst et al. 2002; 
Parkhurst and Shogren 2007).1 The AB is a two-part payment scheme, comprising of a base 
level compensation for all participants and a top-up bonus that they receive if their neighbors 
participate and implement similar land use practices on their properties. By rewarding 
coordinated actions across space, land management decisions of neighbouring farmers under 
the AB scheme can be considered to be strategic interactions in a coordination game, with 
multiple Nash equilibria being Pareto ranked in terms of payoffs. The existence of multiple 
equilibria can, however, give rise to coordination failure. Experimental evidence provided by 
Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) and Warziniack et al. (2007) indicates that the incidence of 
coordination failure can be reduced by repeated interaction that increases participant 
experience and builds reputation for spatial coordination, by setting simple spatial targets to 
which participants can coordinate with relative ease, and by permitting participants to 
communicate prior to choosing their actions. Successful coordination on socially desirable 
land use outcomes are also more likely on landscapes with fewer participants owing to the 
difficulty of coordination in larger groups (Banerjee et al. 2012). 
A key issue that has received limited attention in the AB literature, and which forms 
the focus of this article, is that the outcome of strategic interactions between landowners 
depends on the amount of information available to them about other landowners’ choices. 
This article report results of a laboratory experiment in which the information each 
participant receives about the land use decisions of others is varied. Our interest in this issue 
is motivated by both the nature of relationships within farming communities and the existing 
scientific literature on equilibrium selection and individual behavior in coordination games. 
Interpersonal relationships in agricultural communities are a product of socio-economic ties 
and the properties’ locations on the farming landscape. Farmers may routinely lend and 
                                                     
 1 An alternative approach investigated in the literature is auctions for spatially-coordinated project 
procurement (e.g., Windle et al. 2009). 
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borrow machinery to/from neighbors, lobby together to influence local or national policy 
determination, or become members of the same (regional) input-purchasing and marketing 
cooperatives (Hanson et al. 2004; Parker and Munroe 2007). These ties facilitate the flow of 
information which may be conducive to cooperation with respect to (local) biodiversity 
management (Pretty and Smith 2004). 
Under the AB scheme, where the economic returns to farmers from land management 
actions are a product of strategic interactions with their neighbors, varying the levels of 
information available to a farmer about their neighbors’ actions is likely to impact their land 
use decisions and subsequent payoffs. The literature on the impact of information on 
individual decisions in strategic settings supports this claim. Experimental studies suggest 
that providing more information to subjects increases economic efficiency in terms of Nash 
equilibria selected in coordination games (Berninghaus and Ehrhart 2001) and trust games 
(Bracht and Feltovich 2009). Yet Wilson and Sell (1997) find that more information reduces 
efficiency in public good games, while in the study by Duffy and Feltovich (2002) there is no 
significant impact of providing information about others’ choices on game outcomes at all. 
Thus, the impact of information on choices and the Nash equilibria selected is a function of 
the nature of the strategic environment and the features of the game itself. Therefore, in the 
context of the AB scheme, any claim about land use, environmental outcomes and policy 
effectiveness needs to explicitly consider the impact of varying the information available to 
individuals on their choices and land use configurations obtained. 
This article analyses the impact of varying the information available to human 
subjects who assume the role of farmers in an experimental laboratory environment. The 
laboratory allows us to exercise control over the strategic environment – the testbed (Plott 
1997) and to evaluate the impact of varying the amount of information provided to subjects 
on land management decisions and types of spatial patterns produced. The experiments 
involve subjects arranged on a circular local network where each subject is directly linked to 
a subset of all individuals in the group (the direct neighbors) and indirectly to everyone else 
through their direct linkages (Jackson 2010). Within the circular network structure every 
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subject has two direct neighbors: one to the left-hand side and one to the right-hand side. 
Given this spatial setup, the information treatment involves changing the number of 
individuals whose choices are visible to players during the experiment. In the baseline 
sessions, visibility of actions is limited to a subject’s two direct neighbors only, while in the 
treatment sessions subjects receive information about the actions and payoffs of both their 
direct neighbors and their neighbors’ direct neighbors. These latter we refer to as a subject’s 
(two) indirect neighbors. 
The experiments indicate that information variability produces a significant difference 
in subject behavior and resultant AB configurations. Overall there is more efficient 
coordination in the groups with more information relative to those where information 
exchange is limited to direct neighbors only. However, over time, the beneficial impact of 
extra information on efficient coordination falls. While in early periods of the experiments 
more information results in a larger share of subjects coordinating on the efficient Nash 
equilibrium, with repeated interaction subjects’ behavior reveals a transition towards the 
inefficient, risk dominant Nash equilibrium. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and 
explain the functioning of the AB mechanism on a circular local network structure. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and the implementation of the model in the laboratory. The 
experimental results are presented in section 4 and conclusions given in Section 5. 
 
2. The Model  
 Consider 𝐾 players, indexed 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝐾, representing landowners, each of whom has 
a fixed position on a landscape represented by a circular local network. On the circular 
landscape the neighborhood structure is symmetric whereby each landowner has two direct 
neighbors: one each in the clockwise and an anti-clockwise direction.2 These individuals 
                                                     
 2 As there are no edge effects, employing a circular network structure implies that all subjects face 
identical decision problems. This ensures that we are able to isolate the impact of the information treatment (that 
changes the subjects’ strategic uncertainty) on land management choices and AB performance without having to 
worry about potential confounding problems arising from subjects having different levels of strategic 
uncertainty owing to a varying number of neighbors. 
6 
 
make up the local neighborhood of a player. Landowners are indirectly linked to other 
networked individuals via their direct neighbors. This is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Circular Local Network 
 
 A landowner’s choice set in the AB game is related to how they manage their land. 
Each farmer i can choose between two land management options: 𝜎𝑖 = 𝐺,𝑁. The option 𝐺 
refers to conservation management on agricultural land, and 𝑁 refers to retirement of 
cropland such as under the CRP and converted to “nature farming” referred to as land sparing 
(Balmford et al. 2012). Both land management types thus provide conservation services, but 
N parcels more so than G parcels.3  
 Let us now specify society’s benefits from environment friendly land management 
under the two options 𝐺 and 𝑁. Any parcel of land under either land option yields ecosystem 
service benefits, 𝑠(𝜎𝑖), and let these “stand-alone” benefits be larger under 𝑁 than under 𝐺.4 
                                                     
 3 Of course, the third option is not participating and using the land for intensive agriculture. This 
possibility is however not implemented in the experiment as our focus is on the role of information in 
influencing farmers’ choice of one conservation strategy over the other. We thus implicitly assume that 
compensation is sufficiently generous for both conservation strategies so that it is in the interest of farmers to 
participate. 
 4 Uncultivated or retired land, 𝑁, usually provides good habitat for those species that do not prefer the 
open nature of cultivated land, such as the boreal toad and leopard frog and birds like the sage grouse and white-
faced ibis. Non-crop habitats on retired tracts like flower patches and hedgerows are beneficial for increasing the 
populations of natural pollinators such as honey bees (Carvell et al. 2007). On the other hand, the cultivated land 
management option 𝐺 is conducive to species that like the “openness” of such fields. Meadow birds such as the 
Player i
Player i’s clockwise direct neighbor
Player i’s anti-clockwise direct neighbor
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Let us assume that 𝑠(𝐺) = 5 and 𝑠(𝑁) = 10. Environmental agglomeration benefits exist for 
both types of land management options as well. We assume that these benefits are larger for 
strategy 𝑁 than for 𝐺 given the nature of ecosystem services delivered from these 
management options as mentioned above. Let 𝑛𝑖𝜎 denote the number of direct neighbors of 
landowner i that choose land management option 𝜎𝑖 on the network (landscape). Then the 
agglomeration benefits are denoted by 𝑛𝑖𝜎𝑏(𝜎𝑖) for 𝜎𝑖 = 𝐺,𝑁. Let the values for each 
strategy be 𝑏(𝐺) = 10 and 𝑏(𝑁) = 40. Hence, for any given value of 𝑛𝑖𝜎 (which, in our 
circular local network setup is equal to 0, 1 or 2), both the benefits, 𝑠(𝜎𝑖), and the 
agglomeration conservation benefits, 𝑏(𝜎𝑖), are strictly larger for 𝑁 than for 𝐺.5  
 In addition to the conservation benefits of land use, society values agricultural profits 
too, and these are larger under 𝐺 than under 𝑁. Let us use 𝑟(𝜎𝑖) to denote a farmer’s profits 
from agriculture. When land is managed for agricultural production, profits are positive 
(𝑟(𝐺) = 55)) whilst they are zero when land is abandoned to nature (𝑟(𝑁) = 0). Depending 
on the land use choice of direct neighbors, the social benefits provided by farmer i’s land use 
choice read as: 
 
𝑤(𝜎𝑖) = 𝑟(𝜎𝑖) + 𝑠(𝜎𝑖) + 𝑛𝑖𝜎𝑏(𝜎𝑖),          𝜎𝑖 = 𝐺,𝑁                                                               (1) 
 
 We are interested in the efficiency of land use decisions in the presence of 
agglomeration benefits, and not in how rents are allocated between farmers and the 
government (or the tax payer). For simplicity, we therefore assume that farmers receive the 
full social benefits generated by their pro-environmental land use activities, i.e., they receive 
subsidies equal to 𝑠(𝜎𝑖) + 𝑛𝑖𝜎𝑏(𝜎𝑖). On the basis of our model, the government thus 
                                                                                                                                                                     
burrowing and short-eared owls typically rely on grasslands for nesting and hunting but thrive less well on land 
retired from agriculture and abandoned to nature. 
 5 Note that we assume that the landscape-level environmental benefit contribution of a farmer choosing 
management option 𝑁 depends on the direct neighbors’ decisions, but not on those of their indirect neighbors. 
That is, we assume that the conservation benefits provided are the same independent of whether the direct and 
indirect neighbors to one’s left (right) choose 𝐺𝑁 (𝑁𝐺), or whether they choose 𝑁𝑁 or 𝐺𝐺 both to their left and 
right. This assumption explicitly captures the spatial nature of environmental processes and hence benefits, 
which is often decreasing with increasing distance.  
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implements a payment scheme where the subsidy is set at the Pigouvian level6,7 and 
expression (1) is the payment received by farmer i when choosing land option 𝜎𝑖. This 
specification of the payoff function is similar to the one implemented by Parkhurst et al. 
(2002) and Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) where landowners’ payoffs depend upon the 
management option and the number of participating neighbors choosing that same action. 
 Using the AB payoff function shown in equation (1), table 1 presents the social (and 
private) welfare associated with each land management option and corresponding payoffs 
associated with the AB scheme involving a farmer and their two direct neighbors. On the 
basis of this payoff table, the AB scheme resembles the Stag-Hunt coordination game. This 
game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: 𝜎𝐺 (∀𝑖) and 𝜎𝑁 (∀𝑖) which are Pareto ranked in 
terms of payoffs. The payoffs for 𝜎𝑁 are 90 while they are 80 for 𝜎𝐺  hence the all-𝑁 outcome 
is the Pareto efficient (or payoff dominant) Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the all-𝐺 outcome 
is the risk dominant Nash equilibrium as the deviation loss associated with N is (90–60) = 30 
which is less than the deviation loss for G, which is (80–10) = 70. Given these two outcomes, 
coordination of choices on N or G produces outcomes presented in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 6 By making this assumption we ignore the fact that raising funds for subsidies results in welfare losses 
to society because taxes tend to be distortionary. For second-best considerations, see Mirrlees (1971) and Smith 
and Tomasi (1995). 
 7 The reader may argue that given these modeling decisions the regulator can implement the optimal 
pattern by setting the subsidy equal to 55 or higher if farmers choose N, and zero otherwise. This will make 
choosing N a dominant strategy, independent of what the other farmers choose – there is no coordination 
problem. While this is correct, this scheme is not informative in explaining how subjects behave in the presence 
of subsidies where their payoffs depend on both their own and others’ decisions. Moreover, in the real world, 
the regulator may not be fully aware of both the opportunity costs of land conservation and the conservation 
benefits from agglomeration. Then paying the farmers the social benefits of their actions would ensure that the 
policy would not be welfare-decreasing. 
9 
 
 
Figure 2: Nash Equilibria on Circular Network (red triangles and black circles 
represent N and G choice respectively) 
 
 Harsanyi and Selten (2003) argue that in such coordination games the players’ 
collective rationality regarding higher payoffs will lead them to coordinate to the Pareto 
efficient Nash equilibrium. Yet this outcome is predicated on the risk and payoff dominant 
Nash equilibria corresponding to the same strategy. In our AB policy setting this is not the 
case as choosing the natural land management option 𝑁, while lucrative, is riskier relative to 
strategy 𝐺 as it yields a higher payoff loss upon coordination failure. In a strategic 
environment where every individual is subject to strategic uncertainty about other players’ 
choices, this relative risk ranking may make 𝐺 more likely than 𝑁. The combination of direct 
and indirect links on local networks increases the strategic uncertainty even further. This 
feature, in turn, may prevent the achievement of the social optimum and lead to the inefficient 
outcome – a scenario referred to as coordination failure. Given this setup, our study explores 
the impact of varying the amount of information available to subjects about their neighbors’ 
previous choices, on their likelihood of choosing N and coordinating on the socially optimum 
all-𝑁 outcome. 
 
  
Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium Risk dominant Nash equilibrium
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3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 We consider a circular network of twelve subjects with every subject having a direct 
neighbor to their left and right. These direct neighbors are referred as the clockwise and anti-
clockwise neighbors in the experimental instructions. In addition, every subject is indirectly 
connected to the remaining nine players via their direct neighbors. Group composition and 
neighbor identity is kept constant during the experiment. We adopt this fixed matching 
scheme since on geographical landscapes farm locations and farmer identity are usually 
exogenously given. Additionally, this matching scheme permits us to test the impact of 
subjects’ reputation for the play of a particular strategy on other subjects’ choices. Each 
session has thirty periods during which the subjects play the game whose payoffs are shown 
in table 1. We record data for 12 sessions: 6 baseline sessions termed 2INFO and 6 treatment 
sessions termed 4INFO. The baseline is referred to as 2INFO where each subject is informed 
about the previous and all other past periods’ actions of their two direct neighbors. The label 
4INFO represents the treatment sessions where a subject receives choice information of four 
participants: two direct neighbors and their neighbors’ direct neighbors. 
  
Table 1: Summary of Parameter Values and Game Payoffs 
Market return to abandoned land: r(𝑁) = 0 
Market return to managed agricultural land: r(G) = 55 
Participation component abandoned land: 𝑠(𝑁) = 10 
Participation component managed agricultural land: 𝑠(𝐺) = 5 
Bonus component abandoned land: 𝑏(𝑁) = 40 
Bonus component managed agricultural land: 𝑏(𝐺) = 10 
 Direct neighbors’ choices 
Landowner choice 𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝐺 𝐺𝐺 
𝑁 90 50 10 
𝐺 60 70 80 
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 The experiments for this study were conducted at the Laboratory for Economics 
Management and Auctions (LEMA) at the Pennsylvania State University in February 2012 
with subjects recruited randomly from the student population. In total 144 subjects 
participated: 6 sessions, with 12 subjects per session, were implemented for each of the two 
treatments, resulting in 6 independent observations. The show-up fee was $5 and 
experimental earnings were converted into actual currency at the rate of 150 experimental 
dollars to one real U.S. dollar. The experiments were implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007) and lasted between 45 and 60 minutes per session. 
 During a session, each subject received an ID that determined their position on the 
circular network. Figure 3 represents the networks for 2INFO and 4INFO treatments that 
were shown to subjects during a session. The instructions were made available on the 
computer screen and were read aloud to maintain an environment of common knowledge. 
Subjects were informed about their role as a landowner with two types of land management 
actions, which would generate payoffs. No other contextual terminology such as ecosystem 
services, biodiversity conservation or endangered species was included in the experimental 
instructions, so that subjects would respond only to financial incentives. In keeping with the 
game theoretic nature of the experiment, the instructions mentioned that subjects’ payoffs 
would be influenced by their neighbors’ actions. They were also informed that the AB game 
would be repeated for 30 periods. Before starting the experiment, all subjects participated in a 
quiz about different features of the experiment to verify their understanding of the choices in 
the game and the associated payoffs. 
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Figure 3: Circular Local Network 2INFO treatment (top panel) and 4INFO treatment 
(lower panel) 
 
 
4. Results 
This section is organized into a discussion of individual choices and spatial 
configurations on the network followed by the analysis of underlying behavior explaining the 
experimental outcomes. 
 
4.1 General Results 
 Figure 4 and table 2 present the share of efficient N choices for both treatments over 
30 periods. We make two observations. First, the average share of N choices in every period 
is higher in 4INFO (where subjects are informed about the decisions of both their two direct 
and two indirect neighbors) than in 2INFO (where subjects receive information about their 
direct neighbors’ choices only). Second, when subjects gain more experience during the 
Player i
Player i’s clockwise neighbor
Player i’s anti-clockwise neighbor
Player i
Player i’s clockwise neighbor
Player i’s anti-clockwise neighbor
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game, the average share of N choices falls in both treatments. In 2INFO the value falls from 
63% to almost zero after 20 periods and then stays under 10% for the remaining periods; in 
4INFO subjects are able to sustain positive levels of N choices in all periods although they 
fall from 73% in Period 1 to 18% in Period 30 as well. These results indicate that information 
about choices of more players on the network effectively sustains coordination on the Pareto-
dominant outcome in the short run but not in the long run. 
  
Table 2: Average share of N choices and Cluster metric by Period and Treatment 
Period 
Average N Choice N-Clustering G-Clustering 
2INFO 4INFO 2INFO 4INFO 2INFO 4INFO 
1 0.63 0.74 0.26 0.47 0.06 0.05 
2 0.61 0.67 0.38 0.41 0.15 0.10 
3 0.51 0.68 0.31 0.48 0.28 0.14 
4 0.51 0.61 0.34 0.39 0.31 0.21 
5 0.49 0.65 0.26 0.45 0.28 0.17 
6 0.46 0.65 0.32 0.43 0.40 0.15 
7 0.36 0.65 0.24 0.49 0.51 0.19 
8 0.32 0.61 0.18 0.47 0.53 0.25 
9 0.33 0.53 0.18 0.35 0.51 0.31 
10 0.25 0.47 0.11 0.32 0.60 0.35 
11 0.22 0.39 0.10 0.27 0.65 0.50 
12 0.17 0.39 0.06 0.25 0.70 0.49 
13 0.17 0.40 0.08 0.32 0.74 0.51 
14 0.14 0.43 0.07 0.31 0.78 0.46 
15 0.11 0.40 0.05 0.31 0.81 0.50 
16 0.08 0.39 0.03 0.29 0.85 0.51 
17 0.08 0.38 0.02 0.28 0.83 0.52 
18 0.07 0.35 0.02 0.26 0.87 0.55 
19 0.03 0.35 0.00 0.26 0.93 0.55 
20 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.27 0.97 0.54 
21 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.28 0.95 0.52 
22 0.06 0.38 0.03 0.28 0.92 0.52 
23 0.03 0.33 0.01 0.24 0.95 0.57 
24 0.03 0.32 0.01 0.22 0.95 0.58 
25 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.19 0.94 0.59 
26 0.03 0.26 0.01 0.15 0.95 0.60 
27 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.15 0.90 0.62 
28 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.94 0.76 
29 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.15 0.94 0.73 
30 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.94 0.76 
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Figure 4: Average Share of N Choices by Period and Treatment 
 
 
 Let us next analyze these results formally. Table 3a reports the shares of N choices for 
both treatments using two types of observations: average N choices for the first period taking 
each subject’s action as an independent observation (implying that there are 72 independent 
observations in each cell of the table) and the same averaged over all 30 periods for 6 groups 
(i.e., 6 independent observations per cell). Using Mann-Whitney tests with corresponding p-
values presented in table 3a we find that there is no significant treatment effect in the first 
period. However, over all 30 periods there is a significant impact of information (at 1% level 
of significance). Lack of significance in Period 1 is to be expected as subjects are randomly 
assigned to both treatments, face the same payoff table, and make decisions without receiving 
any feedback about others’ choices. Taking all periods together, during the lifetime of the 
experiment there is a significant impact of providing information about more neighbors to a 
subject. Relative to 2INFO, in 4INFO, subjects’ strategic uncertainty associated with 
choosing the risky payoff efficient strategy is lower. Thus, significantly more players’ 
strategic uncertainty gets resolved in favor of N, leading to more N choices on average in 
4INFO relative to 2INFO. This result holds regardless of the fact that with repeated 
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interactions many subjects switch to the risk dominant equilibrium in both treatments. Since 
at any given point of the experiment choices of more than 50% individuals who have an 
indirect effect on players’ choices is not visible, subjects are considerably uncertain about 
their higher order neighbors’ likelihood of choosing N. As a result, even if N yields a higher 
payoff, a majority of players choose and/or switch to the risk dominant strategy G.  
 
Table 3a: Mean Shares and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of N Choices for 
Period 1 and for all 30 Periods 
 
Share of N choices Treatment Mann Whitney Test 2INFO 4INFO p-value 
Average in Period 1 0.63 (0.98) 
0.74 
(1.22) 0.11 
Averaged over all 30 
periods 
0.19 
(1.22) 
0.43 
(5.16) 0.03 
 
 
4.2 Analysis of Spatial Patterns on Local Networks 
 Having presented the impacts of information and repeated interactions on the 
frequency with which the Pareto efficient N choice is selected, we now analyze the location of 
these N choices and the development of the land choice configurations over multiple periods. 
In figures 5-7 we present snapshots of the network configurations in each of the six sessions 
for periods 1, 15 and 308 where N choices are marked with red triangles and G choices with 
black dots. The spatial patterns in these periods reflect the difficulty of coordinating on the 
Pareto dominant all-N equilibrium. While all groups start with between 7 and 9 subjects 
(mostly adjacent) choosing N in the first period, only the sixth cohort in 4INFO manages to 
reach the all-N equilibrium in Period 15. And while there is no incentive for subjects to 
change from N to G, as all of them are earning the highest payoffs (90) by Period 30, four 
adjacent subjects in this session switch to G. Strategy switches are observed in other groups 
                                                     
 8 We classify our 30-period experiment into three equally spaced time intervals signifying the initial, 
intermediate and final stages. Configuration of choices from all other periods is available upon request.  
 
16 
 
as well: barring the first session in 2INFO and 4INFO, most of the adjacent N choices are 
replaced by contiguous G choices in the remaining cohorts.  
 
 
Figure 5: Period 1 Choices in 2INFO and 4INFO sessions 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Period 15 Choices in 2INFO and 4INFO sessions 
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Figure 7: Period 30 Choices in 2INFO and 4INFO sessions 
 
  
 To support a formal analysis of these outcomes, we construct a metric to measure the 
degree of spatial contiguity generated by the AB scheme in terms of both the frequency and 
location of contiguous N and G choices on the circular network. This metric reflects the 
frequency with which localized clusters of similar land use decisions are produced by 2 
and/or 3 adjacent players. Formally the cluster metric reads: 
 
𝐶𝑡
𝐷,𝑍 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖+1)𝑡 + 𝑦𝐾𝑡𝑦1𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦(𝑖−1)𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖+1)𝑡 + 𝑦𝐾𝑡𝑦1𝑡𝑦2𝑡 + 𝑦(𝐾−1)𝑡𝑦𝐾𝑡𝑦1𝑡𝐾−1𝑖=2𝐾−1𝑖=1 2𝐾    
             (2) 
where 𝐷 ∈ {2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂, 4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂} refers to the treatment, 𝑍 ∈ {𝐺,𝑁} indicates whether the metric 
measures the share of clusters of N choices or G choices, t =1,…,30 denotes period, and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 
1 if 𝜎𝑖 = 𝑍 or 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 otherwise. The first two terms on the RHS of (2) sum up the number of 
clusters consisting of two subjects choosing land use option Z in period t and the last three 
terms do the same for the clusters consisting of three subjects choosing the same option. 
Because the number of two-player and three-player clusters is maximally K, dividing by 2K 
2INFO sessions
4INFO sessions
3
84
00
0100
0 0 0
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ensures that the cluster metric is a number between 0 (if there are zero two-person clusters 
choosing Z in period t) and 1 (if all subjects in a group choose Z in that period). On the basis 
of this metric we can evaluate the development of 𝐶𝑡
𝐷,𝑍 over time to identify how coordinated 
land use patterns on the network change during the experiment. Figure 8 and table 2 presents 
the average values of 𝐶𝑡
2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂,𝑁, 𝐶𝑡4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂,𝑁, 𝐶𝑡2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂,𝐺, and 𝐶𝑡4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂,𝐺 for all thirty periods. 
 The positive values of the metric in all periods imply that within our strategic 
environment, the AB is able to reduce fragmentation of land uses and incentivize the creation 
of localized clusters of N and G choices and the all-N and all-G outcome for the enhanced 
delivery of ecosystem services such as habitat protection and biodiversity conservation. 
Additionally, information about players’ choices produces significant differences in the 
nature of these spatial patterns. Tables 3b and 3c report the p-values associated with Mann-
Whitney tests for the N-clustering and G-clustering metric respectively both for all 30 periods 
and for Period 1 (6 independent observations per cell in both cases). 
 
 
Table 3b: Mean Shares of N Cluster for Period 1 and for all 30 Periods 
Share of N clusters Treatment Mann Whitney Test 2INFO 4INFO p-value 
Average in Period 1 0.26 (0.14) 
0.47 
(0.14) 0.03 
Averaged over all 30 
periods 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.3 
(0.25) 0.03 
 
 
Table 3c: Mean Shares of G Cluster for Period 1 and for all 30 Periods 
Share of G clusters Treatment Mann Whitney Test 2INFO 4INFO p-value 
Average in Period 1 0.06 (0.06) 
0.05 
(0.04) 0.8 
Averaged over all 30 
periods 
0.70 
(0.12) 
0.44 
(0.23) 0.03 
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 We find that the level of N-clustering is significantly different (at 5% level of 
significance) in strategic environments with information exchange between more participants 
than in those where information flows are limited. Thus additional information incentivizes 
land use patterns corresponding to the efficient Nash equilibrium configuration. The fact that 
the treatment effect is significant for efficient N-clustering in Period 1 also suggests that the 
location of players choosing N on the network is significantly different in both treatments 
even if their number is not. Of the players who choose N, a majority are adjacent in 4INFO 
while in 2INFO these players are separated by others choosing G. In terms of G-clustering 
there is no significant difference in Period 1 as shown in table 3b. This result is to be 
expected since there are few G choices in the first period in both treatments: 6% in 2INFO 
and 5% in 4INFO. However, with limited information flows and repeated interactions over 
30 periods, many subjects switch to G in 2INFO, so that on average a significant difference 
(at 5% level of significance) in the overall levels of G-clustering is obtained with 4INFO. 
   
 
Figure 8a: Average N-clustering by Treatment and Period 
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Figure 8b: Average G-clustering by Treatment and Period 
 
4.3 Analysis of individual behavior 
Given the significant differences in outcomes between treatments, this section 
presents an analysis of factors affecting individual behavior in the experiment. We model the 
likelihood of making a socially efficient N choice as a function of a series of factors 
exogenous and endogenous to subjects within a dynamic random effects probit regression 
framework with the subject representing the random effect.9 The dependent variable is a 
binary variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 taking a value of 1 for an N choice and 0 for a G choice by subject 
𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,144) in period 𝑡 (𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,30). 
Three separate models are presented. Model I considers the impact of the two 
exogenous variables: the information treatment D to which every subject is randomly 
assigned and a variable 1/𝑡  that controls for the impact of subjects’ learning on their 
likelihood of making an N choice.10 In addition to these exogenous variables, in Model II we 
consider the effect of a player’s choice in the previous period on the likelihood of selecting N 
in any period. This variable controls for the effect variously termed strategy inertia, 
                                                     
 9 Errors are clustered at the session level following routines suggested by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2005). 
 10 We use the reciprocal of the time period as a measure of learning, since learning is typically 
substantial in early periods of the experiment. 
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precedence effect or simply “force of habit.” An interaction term between the reciprocal of 
the period variable and the lagged choice is included to evaluate whether varying levels of 
subject learning impacts the role of precedence in determining the likelihood of an N choice 
in the current period. Given the strategic setting where neighbors’ choices influence own 
action, a third Model III is considered with a variable 𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 measuring the frequency of direct 
neighbors’ previous period N choices. This variable can take a value between 0 and 2, 
depending upon the number of neighbors selecting N. An interaction term between the 
neighbor choice variable and the inverse period measure is considered to explore the effect 
the neighbors’ choices have on a subject’s likelihood of choosing N at different levels of 
subject learning. All other variables from the two previous models are included in Model III 
as well. The random effects structure of the error term has a component 𝑢𝑖, which is the time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity associated with subject i and the random component 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
for every period. Expression (3) represents the full model with all variables. In evaluating 
model performance, we use the value of the log-likelihood generated during the estimation.  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝐷 + 𝛽𝑦𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾 �1𝑡� + 𝛿 �1𝑡� 𝑦𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜃𝑛𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜋 �1𝑡� 𝑛𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(𝑖 = 1,2, … … .144; 𝑡 = 1,2, … … 30)                                                                                                     (3) 
 
 Table 4 presents the results from the three models. Consistent with our prior 
discussion the dummy estimate is negative and significant (at 1% level) in all the models. We 
also obtain a positive and significant estimate for the period reciprocal variable in all models 
providing support for the negative trend in N choices observed for both treatments, as also 
shown in figure 4. Results from Model II indicate that own past behavior has a positive and 
significant (at 1% level of significance) impact on current period choice of N, i.e., subjects 
are significantly more likely to choose N if they chose N in the previous period. There is thus 
a positive precedent for the choice of N and this effect is a result of strategy lock-in or 
strategy-inertia (Blume 1993). Once having selected a certain strategy subjects maintain that 
choice for a few periods. The fact that this estimate is positive and significant in Model III as 
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well indicates that strategy inertia may delay subjects’ response to their neighbors’ past 
choices for a few periods even if the switch may be the best response. In coordination games 
such as the AB, this strategic lock-in can be attributed to subjects’ voluntary loss-making 
behavior (Brandts and Cooper 2006). Players voluntarily inflict payoff losses upon 
themselves by choosing N, even if their neighbors are choosing G in order to signal their 
sustained commitment towards choosing N. Such costly signaling is useful in reducing 
neighbors’ strategic uncertainty in favor of N, leading them to switch from G to N in 
subsequent periods. More generally, the precedent effect also captures the role of human 
habit in economic decision making: subjects often adhere to what they have done in the past 
regardless of consequences, since a change requires them to make a conscious cognitive 
effort (Kahneman 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The estimate for the interaction between 
precedence and subject learning is negative and significant in Model II only suggesting that 
the effect of precedence is different at different levels of subject learning.11 We also note an 
improvement in the value of log-likelihood from Model I to Model II suggesting a more 
precise modeling framework. 
 
Table 4: Regression Results: Random Effects Models for Land Management Decisions 
Explanatory Variables Probit (=1 if N strategy is chosen) Model I Model II Model III 
Treatment 1.054 ** (0.413) 
0.611*** 
(0.2) 
0.188*** 
(0.066) 
1/Period 2.981*** (0.468) 
4.235*** 
(0.592) 
2.87*** 
(0.757) 
Action in Previous Period -- 2.227*** (0.246) 
1.494*** 
(0.153) 
Previous Action * 1/Period -- -2.279*** (0.7) 
0.038 
(0.608) 
Neighbors in Previous Period Choosing 
N -- -- 
1.484*** 
(0.081) 
Previous Neighbors * 1/Period -- -- -2.03*** (0.337) 
Constant -1.754*** (0.211) 
-2.298*** 
(0.149) 
-2.675*** 
(0.151) 
Log Likelihood -1673.3806 -1092.3514 -864.99581 
𝑖 = 144; 𝑡 = 30 
Note: *** and **, represent significance at 1% and 5%. Robust standard errors (clustered at group level – Rabe-
Hesketh et al. 2005) in parentheses 
                                                     
 11 We do not elaborate on the significant estimate of the interaction term as it is not significant in 
Model III. 
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 Results from Model III provide insights about the likelihood of strategy selection and 
behavior consistent with the principle of Nash equilibrium. The estimate for the number of 
direct neighbors choosing N in the previous period is positive and significant (at 1% level). 
Sustained choice of N by neighbors reduces a subject’s strategic uncertainty in favor of N at 
least within their local neighborhood. Consequently, subjects are more likely to make an N 
choice in the current period in order to create or increase the likelihood of creating an N-
cluster at the centre of which they earn a payoff of 90. This significant effect of neighbors’ 
choices – taken together with the precedent effect – explains the appearance of the all-N 
outcome and localized N clusters in both treatments. Finally, the estimate for the interaction 
term between the reciprocal of the period variable and neighbors’ choices is negative and 
significant (at 1% level of significance), indicating that a subject’s likelihood of selecting N 
as a function of their neighbors’ previous N choices is higher in later periods. Despite being 
more likely to choose G, at higher levels of experience more N choices in a player’s local 
neighborhood in the previous period may serve as a credible signal to them to choose N in the 
current period in order to generate an N-cluster and earn higher payoffs. This result represents 
the relative impact of the strategic interactions within the local neighborhood and the overall 
network environment. It suggests that the effect of direct neighbors’ choices are stronger 
relative to all indirect ones, whereby N-clusters survive in 3 of the 12 experimental sessions in 
the final Period 30 even if many subjects’ strategic uncertainty is considerably resolved in 
favor of G. The value of the log-likelihood is the highest for Model III as well, indicating that 
it most accurately explains the variability in subject behavior in the experiments that produces 
different spatial patterns and corresponding conservation benefit streams.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 Improving the design of agri-environmental policy involving Payment for Ecosystem 
Services schemes requires attention to the spatial configurations of land uses that generate 
conservation benefits such as enhanced ecosystem services delivery. In cases where spatial 
coordination between landowners in undertaking conservation-friendly land management is 
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important, the Agglomeration Bonus can serve as a policy mechanism to incentivize 
coordination when landowners/farmers can voluntarily choose how to manage their land. 
Given the AB mechanism comprises multiple Nash equilibria ― a Pareto dominant and a risk 
dominant Nash Equilibrium ― there is the problem of potential coordination failure to the 
efficient equilibrium. In this article, we experimentally investigate in the laboratory the extent 
of spatial coordination to the socially optimal, Pareto efficient land management outcome on 
local networks. Our study is based on the fact that both direct and indirect linkages between 
landowners in networks can impact the nature of strategic interactions and the resultant 
likelihood of coordination when information flows between landowners are different. 
Information on the choices of other landowners in the network can reduce strategic 
uncertainty and might thus improve coordination towards the socially optimal outcome. 
 We find that spatial coordination to the Pareto efficient outcome is significantly higher 
when farmers have more information available about the land management choice and payoffs 
of their neighboring farmers. This result is policy relevant since it lends scope for improved 
coordination to the social optimum if restrictions on information exchange between 
landowners are relaxed. However, despite the fact that more information induces a higher 
degree of coordination towards selecting the Pareto optimal equilibrium, over time a switch to 
the risk dominant outcome is also found. In the context of improving the delivery of 
ecosystem services and other conservation benefits through land management on local 
networks, this result implies that, although the AB scheme can enhance such a delivery, in the 
long run it may only be partially effective. Finding a way of ameliorating this tendency of 
coordination to move away from the Pareto optimal outcome would be important in any actual 
policy application of the AB if the conservation benefits of spatial coordination are to be 
realized in the long run.  
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions 
(Instructions in italics represent 4INFO sessions)12 
 
General Information: 
This is an experiment in decision making. In today's experiment you will participate in a 
group decision task which involves choosing between two actions. In addition to a $5 
participation fee, you will be paid the money you accumulate from your choices which will 
be described to you in a moment. Upon the completion of the experiment, your earnings will 
be added up and you will be paid privately, in cash. The exact amount you will receive will 
be determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
others. From this point forward all units of account will be in experimental dollars. At the end 
of the experiment, experimental dollars will be converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of 1 U.S. 
dollars for every 150 experimental dollars. If you have any questions during the 
experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you. Please 
do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the 
experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the 
experiment and may not be paid. 
 
Group Decision Task: 
The experiment will have thirty periods. In each period you will be in a group with 11 other 
participants. During this experiment each of you will assume the role of a landowner who can 
adopt one of two types of land use actions on their property. Let these land uses be denoted 
by M and K. You will receive payoffs from choosing any one of these actions. All the 
players including you are arranged around a circular which is shown on the board. The black 
dots on the circle represent the locations of your properties. On this circle, you have two 
neighbors - a clockwise (C) and an anti-clockwise (AC) neighbor. Your neighbors will be the 
same in all periods. You will never know the identity of your neighbors. Your ID will 
determine who your neighbors are. Thus if you are player 11 then your neighbors are players 
10 and 12. Player 12 has you and player 1 as neighbors. Please keep in mind that every player 
has a different set of neighbors. 
 
                                                     
 12 Strategy M refers to choice N in the article and strategy K to choice G. We did not make changes to 
the instructions in the article to maintain consistency with the instructions provided to the subjects during the 
experiment. 
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Your two neighbors and your neighbors’ neighbors together form your local neighborhood. 
For example if you are player 11, then players 9, 10, 12 and 1 make up your local 
neighborhood. Note that player 9 is the anti-clockwise neighbor of player 10 and player 1 is 
the clockwise neighbor of player 12.  
 
In each period, each one of you will make a choice between action M and action K. You will 
each receive money based on your choice and the choices of your neighbors. In a moment we 
will give you a detailed description of your choices and how your payment will be 
determined. Please raise your hand if there are any questions otherwise click "Continue". 
 
Your Payment from Group Decision Task: 
In each period of the experiment, the computer will display the table shown below. Please 
take a moment to look over the table. Whenever you are making a choice, you will be able to 
see this table. This table is the same for everyone and is the same for all thirty periods of this 
experiment. The amounts shown in the table reflect the possible payments you might receive 
for that period. Each number in the table corresponds to a payment (b in experimental dollars) 
resulting from a possible combination of your choice of M or K (row) and your clockwise & 
anti-clockwise neighbors’ choices (column). In general, your payoff increases when you 
choose the same strategy as your neighbors. 
 
Making a Choice in a Period: 
Once the period starts, each of you will choose a strategy (M or K) by clicking on one of the 
buttons that will appear on the right of your screen. You may change your choice as often as 
you like, but once you click on OK your choice for that period is final. Note that when you 
are making your choice, you will not know the choices of others. Also, remember that you 
will never know the identity of anyone else in your group, meaning that all choices are 
confidential and that no one will ever know what choices you make. 
 
At the end of each period, your screen will display your choice and payoff and the choices & 
payoffs of all players in your local neighborhood for the current period - i.e. your neighbors’ 
and your neighbors’ neighbors’ choices and payoffs. Information on your accumulated 
payment through the current period will also be provided. 
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At the end of each period, your screen will display your choice and payoff and the choices & 
payoffs of your neighbors for the current period. Information on your accumulated payment 
through the current period will also be provided. At the end of the experiment, you will 
receive the sum of your payments from all thirty periods converted to real dollars. This will 
be paid to you privately in cash.  
 
We are now ready to begin the experiment. On the next screen you will participate in a quiz. 
Please note that you will not earn any money from participating in the quiz i.e. this is a non-
paying period. Your answers in this quiz will not influence your payoffs at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Quiz: 
1) Suppose one of your neighbors plays strategy M and the other plays strategy K. Then 
your payoff from playing strategy M is 50. 
2) My neighbor has the same neighbors as I do. FALSE 
3) Your neighbors change in every period. FALSE 
4) What is your payoff when you chose K and all your neighbors chose M? 60 
5) At the end of every period you will be able to see the choices and payoffs of players in 
your local neighborhood. TRUE 
 
Screen Shots and z-Tree files are available upon request.  
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